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To describe Russia as a society in transition is politically convenient because it implies 
predictability: we know where Russia is heading, as well as where it is coming from. A 
destination model is the basis for policy prescription designed to achieve the goal of a 
modern market economy and a stable democracy. Transition then becomes a ”mere” prob-
lem of ensuring that the necessary steps are taken to achieve the desired goals, just as 
classic Marxism-Leninist prescriptions addressed the ”mere” problem of the transition to 
socialism. (Richard Rose 1994 p 41) 
Only one and a half decades after the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, 
enormous changes have without doubt taken place in the former communist region. The 
slogans of the 1990s – democracy and market (or vice versa) – have to a large extent been 
realized, more so in the countries in the eastern part of Central Europe than in ”the New 
East”, i.e., Europe to the east of the eastern border of the European Union, and even less so 
in the countries in Caucasia and Central Asia. However, “these countries discarded the old 
socialist regimes and began a transition towards the market economy and democracy” 
(Tegze 1999 p  174). The transformation of the former socialist countries, which are to 
join the EU on May 1st of 2004, has to a large degree been influenced by the demands 
from the EU on their economic and political development, which in itself explains a part 
of the ”success story” that at least some of these countries have experienced. There are 
several growing economies and rather stable democratic systems in this part of Europe, 
although some remnants of the past, i.e., the communist system remain, more in the 
eastern than in the western part of the former communist region. 
This is the picture from a high vantage point. If we look at another part of reality, we 
may also observe another general pattern; namely increasing social inequality. There is 
now a wider gap between the ”new rich” and the ”new poor” (Silverman & Yanowitch 
1997) in nearly every former communist country, even if we compare it with the social 
gap between the upper elite and the common people during the communist era 
(Transition…2002 p xiv). There are, of course differences between different countries in 
this aspect as well, but in general these differences seem to be connected to the new power 
structure – and its relationship to the old one – and the ways the privatization process took 
place. The privatization of the former state enterprises involved enormous opportunities to 
get rich – if you had the right connections to the new power – and some people did.1 
                                            
1
 According to an article in the journal Fortune (2003-09-02), half of the richest ten persons under the age of 
40 in the world are Russians. The famous Roman Abramovich – who owns the English football team Chelsea 
– is number two with an estimated fortune of 8,3 billion US dollar.  
Per Månson   
232 
There is however, also another story, or, better said, a lot of other stories. During the 
fifteen years that have passed since the liberal revolution, millions and millions of ordinary 
people have tried to adjust to the new situation, to take advantage of it or to try to survive 
and live as well as possible. There seems to be a pattern among the citizens of these coun-
tries, which shows that older people and people employed in or who are dependent on the 
public sector – teachers, nurses, students, seniors etc – have more difficulties than young 
people with a high education and connections in the political or the economic sphere. This 
tendency is clearly exemplified by a voting behavior that shows that the older and poorer a 
person is, and the more hardship he/she has experienced in life after the fall of 
communism, the more positive his/her attitude is toward the communist past and 
contemporary communist/socialist parties than among other groups of the population. 
Behind these general images there are therefore millions and millions of different 
destinies, which cannot be grasped if we only study the transformation of the Eastern 
European societies from above. This is not to deny that a large part of the changes have 
been implemented ”from above”, but the result of the incitements, which have been given 
to the ordinary people, basically depends on how they respond to them. When an old 
social order has collapsed and a new is emerging, it is especially important to study how 
”ordinary people in their everyday life” understand and act in the new circumstances. It is, 
as Piirainen (1997 p 4) notes, always ”…the individual people who form the new structure, 
restructure the society. A social order is formed as a collective outcome of individual 
choices and actions — and the restructuring of a society may be seen as an interaction of 
old collective outcomes and new choices and actions made by individual members of 
society.” 
Ever since the beginning of the transformation process, the political leadership in both the 
East and the West and the major international economic organizations have developed a 
specific rhetoric about “the transition to a market economy,” which has since come to be 
reflected in public opinion as well. The economists in the East as well as the West, inspired by 
free market ideas, have been particularly optimistic about the transition. Their implicit point 
of departure was a simplified model of Western capitalism: a system characterized by market 
coordination based on private ownership. They thus saw the transition as a shift from an 
artificial and irrational order based on planning and state ownership, through universal de-
regulation, to a spontaneous, self-regulation, and rational order: the market economy. 
(Chavance 1994 p 205) 
Some of the problems connected with understanding the developments of the former 
communist societies can be analyzed with the help of the concepts transition and 
transformation. The former concept has been used by most social scientists, who have 
studied the post-socialist development (se chapter x in this book). This concept has also 
been used very frequently in the general debate about the direction of the development, 
and the ”transition paradigm” has been very influential in shaping our understanding of 
what has happened and what is going on in the former communist countries. There is, 
however, a hidden and deep-lying idea connected with this concept, an idea that is closely 
related to the general ideological situation that existed when communism fell. One can say 
that around 1990 the neo-liberal ideology reached its peak of influence over the world, and 
that, therefore, the direction, which the new independent countries (NIC) in Eastern 
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Europe should take, was already written.2 The goal of the new countries was supposed to 
be a fast transition to market economies and democratic political systems. Because these 
systems were supposed to exist in the Western countries, the NIC countries were expected 
to evolve in a direction that should make them look like us as fast as possible in ”a new 
crusade”(Cohen 2001), and “as rapidly as the countries announced the abandonment of 
communism, so too did western advisers march in with their sure-fire recipes for a quick 
transition to a market economy” (Stiglitz 1999 p 1). 
Another concept that has been used in this context is the concept of transformation, 
which is preferred by social scientists who are critical to the concept of transition. If we 
look at the etymology of the concepts, we find that ”transition” derives from the Latin 
word transito (crossing), which in its turn comes from transeo (go over, NE 18 p 384). 
This means that ”transition” is a concept that defines a process of going from one place or 
stage to another (like in the word ”transit hall” in airports). In the case of the former 
socialist countries, the starting point was ”communism”, and the end point was ”market 
and democracy” of a Western type. Without going into details about how this concept also 
has influenced the actual development in different countries, one can at least say that most 
of the Western governments and institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the EBRD 
all had this ”bridge concept” of what was to be done in the former communist countries. 
This is not to deny that there actually has been a transition in many of the Central and 
Eastern European countries, especially in the candidate countries, which had clear 
”transitional goals” in order to adjust to the demands of the European Union before they 
could be members. It is also well known that eight of them have succeeded and have 
completed their transition, at least according to the EU standard, and among them, 
especially “Hungary appears to have enjoyed relative success so far in the transition from 
communist rule to democracy and market” (Cox & Furlong 1995 p 1). 
For other former communist countries, however as well as for millions of ordinary 
people in all countries, the concept of transition is not fully appropriate to describe all of 
the changes in their everyday lives. For example, ”the ‘transition to a market economy’ 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union was supposed to stimulate the growth of an 
economy free from the stultifying constraints of the Soviet system of centralized 
management, but in fact it led to an economic collapse unprecedented in world economic 
history. According to the best available data, GDP fell by half between 1990 and 1998.” 
(Clarke 2002 p 2). For Russia, the result was, according to data “in the 1999 World Deve-
lopment Indicators, … poverty—defined as $4 a day—increased from 2 million to over 60 
million by the middle of the decade (Stiglitz 1999 p 1). There are, of course, a many rea-
sons for this catastrophe, external as well as internal.3 The basic idea connected with the 
”transition paradigm” does also have weaknesses from a social scientific point of view: 
A transition implies a temporary state between two fixed positions, a movement between 
the point of departure and that of arrival. Many of the economists, politicians and 
                                            
2
 This “time-situated” aspect of the “transition paradigm” makes one of its critics to argue for abandoning it: 
“The transition paradigm was a product of a certain time—the heady early day of the third way—and that 
time has now passed. It is necessary for democracy activists to move on to new frameworks, new debates, and 
perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change—one suited to the landscape of today, not the 
lingering hope of an earlier era.” (Carothers 2002 p 20) 
3
  See Reddaway & Glinski 2001 and Hough 2001 for analysis of the intertwining of the political and econo-
mic transition in Russia, and Hellman 1998 for all post-communist countries. 
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management consultants involved in the process of restructuring appeared initially to 
place a somewhat unwarranted faith in the inevitability of a transformation to a capitalism 
demand economy, arguing that given the correct and economically rational conditions, 
ideal of standard liberal democracy would eventually take root. In a way reminiscent of 
development thinking of the post-war period, these assumptions hinge on the idea of a 
lineal progression, in which, if the correct procedure is followed, the desired outcome can 
be assured. Theorists of the post-war period assumed that development would lead 
automatically to modernity if local people could only be persuaded to abandon the 
constrains and chains of traditional culture; in a similar fashion, post-socialist planners 
have emphasized the economic freedom which will result as the antiquated machinery of 
state socialism is shed and the principles of free-market capitalism embraced. (Bridger & 
Pine 1998 p 3) 
If we turn to the other concept – ”transformation” – its etymology comes from the Latin 
word transforma’tio (conversion) and transfo’rmo (re-form or reshape, NE 18 p 381). This 
means that ”transformation” is a more abstract concept than ”transition”, or in other words, 
both concepts point at some process of change, but the former concept doesn’t have the 
teleological bias connected with the latter one. This does not mean, of course, that the 
concept of transition should not be used at all, but it means that one has to be conscious of 
its underlying meanings discussed above. One could even say that the tension between the 
concepts transition and transformation could be used in an analysis of different socio-
economic and political outcomes in different Eastern European countries. If there was a 
pronounced goal for the post-socialist direction (for example, to join the EU), it is more 
accurate to use the concept of transition. If such a clear goal never existed, it is better to 
use the concept of transformation. The question in the former case is, then, to identify 
explicit overarching goals, which were set by different actors and analyze if and how they 
have or have not contributed to the transition process. The question in the latter case 
should consequently be to try to identify hidden goals that different actors and groups 
could possibly have and how these goals have influenced the transformation process.  
The concepts transition and transformation can also be used in a discussion about the 
relations between the macro and micro levels in the development of post-socialist 
societies. One may generally suggest that the concept of transition applies more to a macro 
level analysis, while transformation applies more to a micro level analysis. The reason for 
this is that it is much easier to analyze ”system transitions” than ”everyday life 
transitions”. People generally do not have such clear-cut goals in their everyday life that 
we can talk about a starting point and an end point. The ”transition paradigm” is therefore 
more common in macro level social sciences like economics and political science, while 
the ”transformation paradigm” is more common in micro level social sciences like eth-
nology, ethnography and anthropology, with sociology located somewhere in between. 
There is a general pattern in the social sciences that the acting individual is often 
disregarded in macro analysis, and the wider context is often neglected in microanalysis. 
This is nothing strange, both macro and micro level analysis make their respective 
abstractions, which look like a reflection in a mirror.  
Micro level social scientists therefore criticize the use of ”transition” as an analytical 
concept, because ”in conventional portraits of the ‘transition’ the micro is determined or is 
an expression of structures, policies, and ideologies of a macro character, with little 
theorization of the unintended consequences brought about locally by political and cultural 
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contestation intertwined with economic struggles” (Burawoy & Verdery 1999 p 1). Instead, 
the micro-orientated social scientists try to understand how ordinary people in their everyday 
lives understand macro level changes, react to them and try to change their lives in order to 
cope with the changing circumstances. There are, of course, enormous differences between 
how people in the former communist countries react to their new social environment. 
Country, age, profession, social class, gender, place of living, position and experiences in the 
old society compared to position and experiences in the new society, personal preferences 
and dislikes, etc, are examples of factors that separate groups and individuals from each 
other.  
To understand how local traditions and stable social networks on the local level influence 
for example Russian mineworkers in their struggle to survive, the privatization process in a 
small village in Bulgaria or the cross-border trade at the Greek-Albanian border (to name 
just a few of the thousands of local micro analyses that have been made after 1990), we have 
to get a deep and concrete knowledge of the local social structures, which cannot be deduced 
from the macro level social structures. If one studies some of the literature about these micro 
level responses to macro level change, the deepest impression is how different the reactions 
are. There is absolutely no uniform positive or negative response, to the new circumstances. 
Maybe one can say that many people regard the macro level changes as some kind of 
inevitable and inescapable facts of life. This may, of course, be viewed as a heritage from 
the communist past, but at the same time most people do not have more influence over their 
lives now than they did before. One should, therefore, be cautious when trying to understand 
how ordinary ”people cope with the new situation on an everyday basis, how they maintain 
their lives and handle complications and new opportunities” (Arnstberg & Borén 2003 p 7). 
We shall not reduce their actions and reactions to either the old or new social rules emana-
ting from the macro level: 
… we cannot conceive of the transition as either rooted in the past or tied to an imagined 
future. Transition is a process suspended between the two. Policies emanate from the 
centre and encounter resistance, which reverberates back as unintended consequences 
demanding corrections. Policy and reaction enter into a continual interaction that makes 
up the process of the transition. This process is therefore not a unilateral one of moving 
from one stage to the next, as projected in the neoliberal plans, but a combined and 
uneven one having multiple trajectories. (It is for this reason we tend to prefer the term 
transformation, which has fewer teleological resonances than transition.) That is, policies 
combine with preexisting circumstances in different ways to produce different outcomes 
and reactions. This combination means the process is also uneven, affecting different 
regions and, within regions, different sectors at different rates. (Burawoy & Verdery 1999 
p 14f) 
Many people in Eastern Europe have benefited from the changes that have taken place, 
most of them in the political and/or economic spheres. There are also many artists, 
athletes, media celebrities etc. who have successfully climbed to a top position in society. 
Not everyone in the new elite is a newcomer in their positions. Many from the old 
nomenclatura used their position and their connections to find beneficial places in the new 
society. It is true, however, that a majority of the ordinary people has experienced 
hardship, even extreme hardship, during the transition process. There are also many people 
who in one way or another try to continue to live their lives like before. Many things have 
changed, but the wish to make a better life for oneself or one’s own family is not new. 
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Only the rules of the game are new, or perhaps, not as new as many people think. These 
”ordinary people” do not belong to the lowest and poorest class, but they are still not a part 
of the upper-middle class. They “constitute an overwhelming majority—70percent of all 
Russian households” (Avraamova 2003 p 504), and most of them try to live according to 
the new economic and political reality, but at the same time, use their social experiences of 
how to behave to succeed with their life projects.  
In the following two chapters we will meet some of these ”ordinary people” who have 
found a way to adapt to the new realities in Russia and try to work toward an upward 
social mobility or respect for the laws. In other words, they try to live and work in the new 
Russian society and to behave as if it really has transformed into a democratic society with 
a stable market economy. One group represents the economic sphere, and consists of 
young professional businessmen/women who have spent a lot of time and money to get an 
education in a Western business school and to implement that knowledge in their current 
occupations. The other group represents the political public sphere, and consists of ac-
tivists in different human rights NGOs. The reason why they chose to live like they do, 
how they regard the new society, their hopes and fears can tell us a lot about how these 
“people in transition” contribute to the large scale transformation of their society. People 
obviously cannot live in a new society as long as they think that the old one still prevails. 
Even if these two groups do not represent the majority of the Russian population, it is 
interesting to analyze them because they represent people who behave as if the goals of the 
transition – a stable democracy with an open public sphere and a civilized market econo-
my ruled by law –have already been achieved. The point is not whether Russia already is a 
stable democracy with a modern market. The point is that when people start to act as if 
these social institutions exist, they contribute in a small but important way to the social 
construction of these institutions. If they succeed is another question, it depends on forces 
far beyond their control. The point is that they try to create a society in which they want to 
live.  
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